Virginia Supreme Court Rules on Use of Unsigned Contract Copies as Evidence
Harris v. Joplin, Record No. 240450 (Va. June 13, 2025)
The Supreme Court of Virginia answers the question of whether an unsigned legible copy of a contract can be used to prove the contents of an illegible signed contract.
Terae Harris was backing out of a parking spot in an Enterprise rental vehicle when he hit and injured James Joplin, who was riding a motorcycle. Shortly afterward, Enterprise offered Joplin $25,000 to settle the matter and release both Enterprise and Harris from liability. An Enterprise adjuster emailed a settlement agreement to Joplin’s attorney but never received a response. Joplin sued Harris shortly before the statute of limitations expired. About two years later, Joplin’s attorney found the signed agreement in his computer system and sent it to the Enterprise adjuster. Though the agreement released both Enterprise and Harris from liability, Joplin’s attorney told the adjuster that Joplin only intended to release Enterprise. Regardless, Harris filed a plea of accord and satisfaction, arguing that the signed agreement barred suit against him.
Problems arose, however, when Harris sought to introduce the document as evidence at the plea hearing. Due to the document’s age, it had faded to the point of being illegible. So, Harris attempted to prove the contents of the signed but illegible release by asking the adjuster whether it matched an unsigned but legible copy of a standard Enterprise release. Joplin objected, arguing that using the unsigned release to prove the contents of the signed release violated the parol evidence rule, but the trial court overruled the objection and ultimately sustained the plea. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, so Harris appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled for Harris. While the parol evidence rule prevents the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret or modify contracts, it does not prevent using such evidence to prove what an illegible contract originally said. And, Harris only needed to prove that connection by a preponderance of the evidence. The adjuster’s testimony that the unsigned release matched what he sent and received back from Joplin’s attorney was enough evidence to support admitting it. Thus, there was enough evidence for the trial court to find for purposes of admissibility that the two releases contained the same terms.
Notably, but in a footnote, the Court suggested that the “more appropriate” objection to admission of the unsigned release would have been on best evidence grounds under Rule 2:1002. That Rule “requires a party to produce the original writing as a prerequisite to proving its contents.” It declined to analyze that Rule’s application to this case however as Joplin had not made that objection below.