The Supreme Court of Virginia Defines Scope of Child Abuse Reporter Immunity Code § 63.2-1512
Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Record No. 250902 (Va. Apr. 2, 2026)
The case arose from a December 2019 incident in which Nicholas Cupp was flying with his family, including his thirteen-year-old daughter, on a Delta flight from Atlanta to Newport News. During turbulence, Cupp comforted his daughter, and a flight attendant interpreted his behavior as potentially involving human trafficking or sexual abuse. The flight attendant reported her suspicions and the police were eventually contacted. Officers met the plane, detained Cupp, and questioned both him and his daughter before concluding there was no probable cause to arrest him.
Cupp filed suit because of the incident, asserting claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment. The defendants removed the case to federal court, then moved to dismiss it, asserting statutory immunity under § 63.2-1512. The district court granted the motion, finding that immunity applied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Virginia: “Is a nonmandatory reporter who made a good-faith complaint regarding suspected child abuse to law enforcement without speaking to a Department of Social Services employee entitled to the immunity from civil liability provided by Virginia Code § 63.2-1512?”
The Court answered “no.” It held that the statute’s immunity is limited to four discrete categories of conduct, each tied to specific statutory provisions. For nonmandatory reporters, the only potentially applicable category involves complaints made “pursuant to § 63.2-1510,” which authorizes complaints only to the local department of social services or the Department’s toll-free hotline. Because Thomas reported her suspicions to law enforcement rather than to DSS, her complaint was not made pursuant to § 63.2-1510 and therefore could not trigger the immunity.
The Court rejected the defendants’ public policy argument—that the statute’s purpose of encouraging abuse reporting requires extending immunity to all good-faith reporters regardless of how or to whom they report. It reasoned that the General Assembly deliberately limited immunity to four specified categories and further narrowed eligibility within those categories by cross-referencing other statutes. Had the legislature intended blanket immunity for all good-faith reporters, it would not have included those limitations.
The Court likewise rejected the defendants’ invocation of the absurdity canon, noting that it does not apply where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and that in any event the statute is neither internally inconsistent nor incapable of operation simply because it immunizes some but not all good-faith reporters. The Court was careful to note that its holding does not automatically impose civil liability on the defendants. It means only that their potential liability must be resolved through the ordinary adjudication of Cupp’s tort claims rather than through a plea of statutory immunity.